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“…[T]he transport system provided channels to the remotest villages, but the water that might 
have flowed through such channels was simply not there”. (Issawi, 1968) 
  
I. Introduction 
 
This note is an attempt to view Egypt’s present human development within the Information 
Revolution in light of the country’s historical experience with the Industrial Revolution. The 
objective is not to undertake an exhaustive review of Egypt’s economic history at this time, but 
rather to draw attention to some historical parallel between today’s Egypt and Egypt of the 
second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The purpose of this note is to raise 
questions rather than answer them. It is an introduction to a more extensive research analyzing 
the many aspects of Egypt’s human development then and now. Within such research, the 
historical lens would be used to draw lessons from the past to ensure proper utilization of the 
potential benefits of the Information Revolution for Egypt’s current and future human 
development. 
 
Specifically, the analysis draws on Charles Issawi’s argument of an “asymmetric” model 
characterizing Egypt’s development in response to the Industrial Revolution in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Issawi’s main thesis is that Egypt was “hit” by the Industrial 
Revolution at a time when the country lacked the appropriate social and economic conditions, 
the necessary trained manpower, strong experienced native bourgeoisie/middle class, and the 
enlightened government required to adapt to the new paradigm (Issawi 1968). This paper is a 
preliminary attempt to use Issawi’s lens to look at today’s Egypt as the country is “hit” by the 
Information Revolution.  
 
The analysis will be provided in five parts. The second section will present Issawi’s image of 
Egypt at the start of World War 1. Section 3 presents a parallel picture of Egypt against the 
Information Revolution. In Section 4, I provide a concluding comparison. A final word wraps 
up this presentation. 
 
II. Egypt and the Industrial Revolution 
 
At the start of World War 1, Egypt is described by Issawi as being “far ahead in economic 
development as measured by agricultural output, foreign trade, transport facilities, and, to a 
lesser degree, employment in industry” (Issawi 1968). In 1913, Egypt’s GDP per capita was 
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higher than Japan, more than double India’s, half of Italy’s, and one eighth of the United 
States’. Egypt also experienced a positive trade balance (a surplus of L.E. 7 million) as well as 
strong communication channels (Issawi 1968). 
 
In particular, Egypt was strong on railway connectivity. Building the railways in Egypt started 
in 1853 -- far ahead of other underdeveloped countries, and indeed developed countries like 
Sweden and Japan. By 1913,  “relative to its inhabited area, Egypt… was as well provided with 
railways as any country in the world and … relative to its population, it was better off than 
most”. Only in 1870s were Argentina and Brazil able to surpass Egypt's mileage. Japan was 
not able to catch up until 1890s, and China in 1900s (Issawi 1968). 
 
With one of the highest railway mileage at the time, the railways were used mainly for 
transporting Egypt’s main export crops (cotton, rice, and onions), and imports, (coal, timber, 
building material). Given that all materials and skills remained to be imported, the railways 
were not utilized to develop Egypt’s indigenous capacity. They did not generate feeding 
industries, provide a market for local industries, encourage indigenous technical innovation 
and/or develop entrepreneurial and financial endeavors. According to Issawi, the railways 
practically had “no multiplier” effect on the Egyptian economy; they actually exposed the 
country’s handicrafts to foreign competition which eliminated most of them, eradicating “an 
important potential breeding ground for a native bourgeoisie” (Issawi 1968). The railways 
simply maintained the status quo as far as Egypt’s economic development was concerned and 
were not utilized as drivers for human development. 
  
In fact, except for GDP, the state of what we today call “human development” [1] was rather 
dismal in Egypt at the start of the twentieth century. In 1907, the adult illiteracy rate was 97%, 
and the quality of the existing education remained poor (Issawi 1968). Investment in education 
was very low. From 1882 to1901, only 1.5% of the state expenditure went to education, 
increasing to 3% in the beginning of 1900s, then down again to 1.7% in 1920/21 (Hershlag 
1980). Life expectancy was low, infant mortality rates were high, and hygienic conditions in 
Egypt’s villages “were the worst in the world” (Issawi 1968).  
 
Extending the definition of human development to include, among other things, technological 
development, income distribution, and the composition of the export basket, it is feasible to 
conclude that Egypt faired poorly on all those grounds. The country’s technological 
achievement lagged far behind any positive economic performance. Technical skills and 
managers for the large enterprises were imported from Europe; small businesses were owned 
and run by the foreign local bourgeoisie, namely Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Lebanese and 
Syrians. In such a situation, income distribution was highly unequal and there was barely a 
local middle class (Issawi 1968). 
 
Egypt’s positive trade balance reflected an export basket that continued to be dominated by 
agricultural goods and primary products – mainly cotton. Capital goods dominated imports, 
mostly coming from Europe. In fact Egypt ended up by being an “export-oriented, lopsided 
economy”, with minimum structural development on the social and economic levels. 
According to Issawi, Egypt’s growth at that time was mainly through foreign capital inflow, 
transport and trade development, a process “whose course and speed (was)…prescribed by 
foreigners to suit their own interests” (Issawi 1968). It is not surprising to find that almost 50% 
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of Egypt’s exports went to Britain, which was also the source of some 41% of Egypt’s imports 
(Hershlag 1980). 
  
Agriculture continued to represent the largest share in output, with very little development in 
local industry. The latter was characterized by “international uncompetitiveness, its low 
productivity and its heavy dependence on imported raw materials” (Owen 2002). Egypt 
imported the capital and the expertise needed to run the economy.  
 
In short, despite some positive indicators of economic “growth” and strong connectivity, at the 
start of World War 1 Egypt suffered serious shortages in several other aspects of economic – 
and more generally – human development. Most importantly, what Egypt went through in the 
nineteenth century was a massive expansion in its railway connectivity that was not 
accompanied by a similar investment in human capital. Not surprisingly, this expansion in 
transport routes did not trickle down into a tangible developmental impact on the economy: no 
development of feeding industries, no use of the transport channels to export high value added 
products, limited investment in education, training and developing indigenous technological 
capacity. The “pipes” continued to be used for exporting primary products and importing 
capital goods along with foreign expertise. Naturally, this was also associated with social and 
technological backwardness, which meant that Egypt continued to witness, if at all, some 
growth, but without development (see Table 1).  
 
III. Egypt and the Information Revolution 
 
Just as Egypt was ahead in railway connectivity more than a century ago, Egypt has recently 
embarked on an ambitious plan to strengthen the infrastructure of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). ICT expenditures soared in the second half of the 
nineties (see Fig. 1). In particular, since 1999, the Egyptian Government has taken several 
initiatives to expand ICT connectivity: the free Internet, Personal Computer for every home, 
Personal Computer for every student, laptop for every professional, Information Technology 
clubs, E-government gateway, and the Smart Village. Between 1999 and 2004, the number of 
fixed telephone line subscribers has almost doubled (from 4.9 million to 9.35 million lines), 
mobile telephone users have increased from 654 thousand to 6.8 million, Internet users have 
increased from 300 thousand to 3.7 million, communication capacity has increased from 20 
million bit/second, to 1285 million bit/second (Ministry of Communication and Information 
Technology 2004). Egypt’s data on teledensity, waiting lists, communication costs, radios and 
television sets were by far higher than the average for the Middle East and North Africa in 
2001 (see Table 2). As far as ICT connectivity is concerned, Egypt can be considered a leader 
in the region, a status that is perhaps reminiscent of the railway leadership in the nineteenth 
century. 
 
Alas, Egypt’s current state of human development continues to lag behind (see Table 1). The 
country falls at the end of the third quartile under medium human development nations. Its 
Human Development Index ranking among 177 nations has deteriorated from 115 in 2000 to 
120 in 2002 (UNDP 2001 & 2004a).  
 
Egypt’s GDP per capita rank minus HDI rank is a negative 12, which means that Egypt has 
been doing relatively better on GDP account than on human development, when education and 
health indices are included (UNDP 2004a). The adult illiteracy rate continues to be high (45%), 
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and 21% of the population aged 15 or higher possess a secondary or higher education (UNDP 
2003). The quality of education is generally poor, and private lessons are the norm rather than 
the exception in government and indeed private schools which follow the state curricula. While 
health indicators are overall above average for other developing countries (UNDP 2004b), the 
quality of health services remains generally low. 
 
Egypt’s announced rate of unemployment is 10%; and sadly the percentage of the unemployed 
is highest among holders of secondary school education (22.4%). Almost 9% for university 
degree holders are unemployed, while only 1.5 % out of below secondary degree holders are 
unemployed (UNDP 2003). Such unemployment of the educated poses a threat to human 
development.   
 
Egypt continues to have large income disparities. Almost 44% of the population lives below $2 
a day. The share of the richest 20% of the population in income is 44%, while that of the 
poorest is 8.6% (UNDP 2004b). 
 
Egypt no longer has a positive trade balance. The trade deficit reached more than $ 6 billion in 
2003. Primary products continue to dominate the export basket (47% of exports in 2002), with 
very limited diversification. While the share of manufactures in exports has increased to 35% 
in 2002, high technology exports still represented a meager 1% of merchandize exports in 
2002. This comes in sharp contrast to an average of 20% for developing countries (see Fig. 2). 
Capital goods continue to occupy a relatively high share of Egypt’s imports, 21% in 2003 
(Central Bank of Egypt 2004a). Egypt’s trade balance in IT is negative (see Fig. 3). 
 
Egypt also continues to have a high concentration of trade markets between Europe and the 
United States. In 2003, 37% of Egypt's exports went to the United States; 34% to the European 
Union; 35% of Egypt's imports come from the European Union and 25% from United States 
(Central Bank of Egypt 2004a & 2004b). Egypt’s IT trade in particular is mostly with the 
United States (see Fig. 4). This is reminiscent of Egypt in the past when most of the trade was 
with a single country, Britain in that case. 
  
What is also disturbing is that Egypt’s performance on technology achievement is quite 
modest. In 2001, the country ranked 57 among 72 countries with respect to technology 
achievement indices [2]. Egypt’s e-readiness rankings have been very modest compared to 
other countries in the world [3]. The country’s global competitiveness ranking deteriorated 
from 41 out of 102 countries in 2000 to 58 in 2003 [4]. From 1996-2002, Egypt spent 0.2% of 
GDP on R&D, a figure that comes in sharp contract to Jordan’s 6.3% and Israel’s 5% (UNDP 
2004b), or even an average of 0.9% for lower middle income countries. The number of 
scientists and engineers per million people in Egypt was 493 in 1995, a figure that falls short of 
an average of 808 for lower middle income countries (World Bank 2003b). 
 
The above exposition points to a picture of Egypt that is currently experiencing modest levels 
of economic – and more generally - human development. Egypt has been witnessing an 
expansion in ICT connectivity at the same time that the country has poor education, 
technological achievement and e-readiness indicators, uncompetitive industrial base, continued 
reliance on primary products for exports, undiversified export basket, concentration of trade 
partners, and unequal income distribution. This is reminiscent of nineteenth and early twentieth 
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century Egypt where leadership in railway connectivity did not trickle down into a tangible 
developmental impact on the economy, specifically the indigenous technological capacity.   
 
Based on this, one may conclude that Egypt has faired relatively well on ICT connectivity 
indicators, but not so high on human development. At this point, one may only raise alert to the 
danger of focusing on expanding the “pipes” without much attention to the “water” that flows, 
and to developing the human capital that engineers the process. In order to make a more 
assertive assessment, further research is needed on the potential and current multiplier effects 
of ICTs on the Egyptian economy, linkages to feeding industries and the productivity impact of 
ICT production vs. ICT use. This will be the subject of future research.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Today’s Egypt in the Shadow of the Past 
 
The above note has been a preliminary attempt at rereading Issawi’s analysis of Egypt in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as it pertains to today’s Egypt against the information 
revolution. Egypt is now being “hit” by the information revolution which is providing a 
potential for developing countries. Just like Egypt faired well on railway connectivity after the 
Industrial revolution, the country seems to have focused on expanding ICT connectivity 
channels in response to the Information Revolution. Such expansion in the ICT “pipes” - 
telephone lines, computers, Internet connectivity and mobile telephony – does not seem to have 
been accompanied by similarly impressive indicators of economic and human development.  
 
As the government embarks on ambitious programs to expand ICT connectivity, one cannot 
help but wonder whether Egypt is again facing a situation where the expansion in 
communication could be triggering current and/or potential economic growth that falls short of 
achieving an improvement in human development. The context might seem different, yet 
Egypt’s challenges could simply be another manifestation of history repeating itself (see Table 
1). Unless Egypt learns from its past, we might very well be witnessing another cycle of, if at 
all, some growth without development. 
 
It is then important to note that connectivity alone is necessary but not sufficient for alleviating 
poverty and improving the state of human development. Investment in connectivity 
infrastructure should be accompanied by a parallel investment in human resources: a 
revamping of the educational system, an aggressive campaign to eradicate illiteracy, and a 
change in attitudes with respect to vocational training. This should be accompanied by efforts 
to modernize the business environment and provide opportunities for small and medium 
enterprises in order to build and strengthen the native bourgeoisie and middle class. Such 
change in the socio-techno-economic paradigm is needed in order to properly utilize the 
Information Revolution as a driver for development. 
 
Issawi’s conclusion on Egypt against the Industrial revolution becomes very appropriate here: 
   
Egypt’s social upsurge had to await a new age: the age of national governments 
working through a native middle class, universities, schools, radios, village roads, and 
motor car. This social upsurge may, in turn, be expected to lead to marked increase in 
the rate of economic growth. (Issawi 1968) 
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V. A Final Word 
 
If indeed today’s Egypt is a mirror image of the past, the consequences of yet another 
asymmetric growth model would be quite serious. With the difference in the pace, 
pervasiveness and potential of the two Revolutions, Egypt cannot afford today to relive the 
experience of the nineteenth century. The country would then be in dire need to review its 
human capital and technological development strategies in order to secure the proper socio, 
cultural and techno economic paradigm for an information based economy that fully utilizes 
and capitalizes on the potential benefits of the Information Revolution as a driver for human 
development. 
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2003
0.653***
HDI Rank deteriorating (from 115 in 
2000 to 120 according in 2002) ***
Population 70.5** 
GDP Low GDP per capita
Education                
Iliteracy Rate (15+)  45%***
Expenditure on Education 19.7% of Gov. expenditure, and 6.7% of GDP in 2000/01^^^
Health                                            
Life Expectancy  69***
Infant Mortality Rate (per 
1,000 people) 33^
Child Matnutrition (% of 
children under 5) 4^
Competitiveness
GCI Ranking for Egypt out of 102 
countries deteriorated from 41in 
2000 to 58 in 2003 ^^
Trade Balance Deficit of more than $6 mn
  Imports/GDP 23%***
  Exports/GDP 16%***
Composition of Exports
 Primary exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 47***
Manufactured exports (% 
of merchandize exports) 35***
High-technology exports 
(% of merchandise 
exports)
1***
  Capital Goods (% of 
Total Imports) 21%^Very High 
 Surplus of about $ 7 mn L.E (1910-1914)
23%
26%
Low diversification
Very High
Very Low
1.5% of the State expenditure directed to 
education in 1882-1901; increased to 3% in 
the beginning of 1900s, then down again to 
1.7% in 1920/21#
Falls at the end of the third quartile 
under the Medium Human 
Development nations***
LOW
Low human indicators and slow social 
progress  
12
High GDP per capita
 Industry characterized by "international 
uncompetitiveness", low productivity and 
heavy dependence on imported raw 
materials".##
"Hygienic Conditions in Egyptian villges were 
among the worst in the world"  
Low
Very High  
Human Development 
Index (HDI)
97% (in 1907)
1913~
Table 1: Human and Other Development Indicators, Egypt Then and Now
 
~     All 1913 information is from Issawi (1968) unless otherwise indicated. 
#     Hershlag (1980) 
##   Owen (2002) 
*     UNDP (2001) 
**   Central Bank of Egypt (2004a)(Figure for the Year 2003/2004) 
*** UNDP (2004) 
^     World Bank (2003a) 
^^   Egypt National Competitiveness Council (2004) 
^^^ UNDP (2003). 
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 ICT infrastructure & access   Egypt  
Middle 
East & 
North  
Africa
Lower Middle Income Countries
 
 2001   2001   2001  
 Telephone mainlines 
 Per 1,000 people   104   99   146 
 In largest city (per 1,000 
people)   173   127   524 
 Waiting list (thousands)   583   5,367   27,675 
 Revenue per line ($)   383   585   283 
 Cost of local call ($ per 3 
minutes)   0.01   0.02   0.04  
 Mobile phones (per 1,000 
people)   43   53   110  
 International 
telecommunications 
 Outgoing traffic (minutes per 
subscriber)   33   102   58 
 Cost of call to U.S. ($ per 3 
minutes)   2.91   ..   4.50  
 Daily newspapers (per 1,000 
people)   31   33   ..  
 Radios (per 1,000 people)   339   277   346  
 Television sets (per 1,000 
people)   217   171   292  
Computers and the Internet
 Personal computers 
   
 Per 1,000 people   15.5   31.7   28.1 
 Installed in education (thousands)   48.8   ..   ..  
Monthly off-peak access         
charges 
 Service provider charge ($)   8.7   26.6   16.7 
 Telephone usage charge ($)   0.14   0.22   0.23  
Source:World Bank (2003b)
Table 2: ICT Infrastructure & Access, Egypt vs. MENA & other Developing Countries
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Figure 1: ICT Expenditures in Egypt 1996-2001 ($ millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: World Bank (2003b) 
 
Figure 2: High Technology Exports as a % of Manufactured Exports in 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: UNDP (2004b) 
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Figure 3: Egypt’s Total IT Imports and Exports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: American Chamber of Commerce (2002) 
  
Figure 4: U.S. Presence in the IT Market in Egypt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: American Chamber of Commerce (2002) 
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Endnotes 
 
[1] The Human Development Index (HDI) was devised by the UNDP and is measured as the 
average of indicators assessing three components: GDP per capita, education, and health. 
 
[2] This ranking is based on the Technology Achievement Index (TAI) built on four 
components: technology creation, diffusion of recent innovations, diffusion of old innovations, 
and human skills (UNDP 2001). 
 
[3] E-readiness indices vary depending on the source. Mainly an e-readiness index is a 
weighted average of indicators, some ICT related, and sometimes general economic indicators. 
For a review of e-readiness indicators, see Rizk (2004). 
 
[4] This ranking is based on the Global Competitiveness Index (CGI) built on three pillars: 
macro economic environment, quality of public institutions, and technology diffusion (Egypt 
National Competitiveness Council 2004).   
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